Book Review: John McGowan, Pragmatist Politics: Making the Case for Liberal Democracy by Voparil, Christopher
Education and culturE 30 (1) (2014): 113-118    113
Book rEviEw
John McGowan's Pragmatist Politics
Christopher J. Voparil
John McGowan, Pragmatist Politics: Making the Case for Liberal Democracy. Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012. 231 + xxxii pp. ISBN 978-0-8166-
7904-1. $22.50 (pbk).
Given how much the tradition owes to Dewey’s pragmatic reconstruction of phi-
losophy, that more is not written of a political bent by those working under the sign 
of pragmatism is to me always surprising. John McGowan’s Pragmatist Politics is a 
shining exception. The book’s aim is “to articulate and practice a liberal democratic 
ethos inspired primarily by the American pragmatist tradition.”1 Two compelling 
opening chapters lay out McGowan’s melioristic conception of pragmatism as a 
philosophy of possibility animated by a belief in progress, drawing most heavily 
from James and Dewey but ranging well beyond them, both within the pragmatist 
tradition and outside it. Three subsequent chapters articulate “a vision of a pos-
sible liberal democracy” in the spirit of this philosophy of possibility and progress, 
devoted, respectively, to the liberal democratic ethos itself, human rights, and an 
alternative vision of that ethos as “secular comedy.” Most prominent in this vi-
sion is a Deweyan conception of democracy as “a moral idea” and a “way of life.”2
For McGowan, pragmatism is, at bottom, a philosophy of action and pos-
sibility. And it is by “reconfiguring what can be meant by ‘the possible’”3 that his 
pragmatist politics generates its transformative, melioristic energy. When tied to a 
“liberal democratic ethos,” cashed out primarily in Deweyan terms that emphasize 
lived relations and communicative associations, McGowan’s “liberal democratic 
pragmatics” is a countervailing force in the face of four existing threats that it is 
well-placed to oppose: the expanding income and wealth inequality; the continued 
growth of American imperialism; ever-present nativist fears and antipathy toward 
non-English speaking immigrants; and the ill effects of globalization and changing 
technologies. In the face of these and other challenges to the democratic ethos, prag-
matists, in McGowan’s view, “strive to close the gap between the few and the demos.”4 
McGowan’s is a capacious pragmatism that draws a common-sense real-
ism from Peirce, James, and Dewey, at the same time that it learns from Rorty, 
Putnam, and Cavell. Wittgenstein, Arendt, Nussbaum, and Latour (“the most 
important contemporary descendant of the pragmatists”) occupy prominent places 
as well. Those looking for ammunition to wage battle in the various internecine 
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wars among classical, paleo-, neo-, and new pragmatists, thankfully, will find none 
here. “Nothing significant,” he tells us, “hinges on whether what I say deserves the 
name ‘pragmatist’ or not.”5 Yet it is nonetheless clear that pragmatist philosophy 
is at the center of democratic action for McGowan. Most interesting is McGowan’s 
use of Kenneth Burke, a figure—at least the pre-1940 Burke—whom he has argued 
over the last decade is best understood as a pragmatist. Indeed, there is much in 
Burke’s account that echoes and enriches Peirce’s semiotics, Dewey’s transaction-
alism, James’s emphasis on relations, and Mead’s account of interpretive activity. 
Yet Burke also offers McGowan a framework for bringing these disparate elements 
together in novel and productive ways—for instance, how Burke’s understanding 
of literature as providing “equipments for living” suggests ways to bridge language 
and experience. 
Among the signal contributions of this book is the explicit, extended atten-
tion to a “qualified ‘reconstruction’ of the idea of the progress” that forms the sec-
ond chapter. Highlighting the melioristic commitments behind the progressivism 
of James, Dewey, and Addams, as well as the philosophical orientation informed 
by “the positivist faith in science’s ability to improve human life” shared by Peirce, 
James, and Dewey, McGowan sees a reconstruction of progress as essential to prag-
matism’s ability to spirit us through current doldrums of “leftist quietism” by craft-
ing animating visions of an alternative future.6 Importantly, this reconstruction 
entails attending to the ways in which a standard of progress has justified colonial 
and imperial projects of the past by offering “a metric to determine which lives are 
‘more precious’ than others.”7 McGowan usefully reminds us that James and Dewey 
already were enacting a reconstruction of the 19th century notion of progress they 
inherited, with its Hegelian ontological guarantees. James and Dewey, on his view, 
“refuse to believe progress is necessary or that human action is necessarily futile,” 
but also “refuse to condemn or embrace modernity tout court.”8 For both, rever-
sion is always possible. This chapter draws on and illuminates James and Dewey 
on progress in familiar and fresh ways, intertwining it with their commitments to 
pluralism. While perhaps not an issue for all readers, somewhat surprising is the 
absence of attention to moral progress we find in Rorty, a figure on whom McGowan 
elsewhere in the book is a reliable, non-polemical interpreter.
Paramount in McGowan’s pragmatist ethics and politics is the notion of “hu-
man responsiveness to others and to situations.”9 This conception of morality as 
responsiveness, derived primarily from James and Dewey, translates for McGowan 
into making “to what and to whom should I be responsible?” the most fundamen-
tal question of ethics.10 The liberal democratic ethos that McGowan expounds 
eloquently and powerfully in Chapter 3 is defined by both our collective, coopera-
tive responsibility to the world we inhabit and seek to create, and our individual 
responsiveness to the concrete others with whom we share this world—a social 
morality that nicely integrates Deweyan communication and deliberation with 
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James’s attention to the “cries of the wounded.” This “liberal democratic pragmat-
ics” promises not a “formula for reaching agreement on moral or political issues,” 
but a “modus vivendi for coexisting peacefully with disagreements.”11
In its understated way, Pragmatist Politics offers one of the more devel-
oped statements of a pragmatist political theory that I have seen in some time, 
providing not just a rehash of Deweyan and Rortyan theoretical oppositions but 
a genuine, constructive forging ahead. Chapter 4’s account of a pragmatist con-
ception of rights, which McGowan defines relationally as “the terms of our rela-
tionships with others and with the ways those terms are produced, articulated, 
and enforced,”12 is a case in point. Drawing on Dewey and Rorty, though refresh-
ingly not in a weighty, explicit way that risks being dragged down by polemical 
baggage, as well as Hannah Arendt and Michael Ignatieff, whom he suggests 
gives us “the most convincing arguments for a pragmatist approach to rights,”13 
McGowan evinces a conception of rights as “claims” that “depend on an inter-
subjective recognition of their validity if those claims are to be satisfied, either 
legally or more informally.”14 Informed by Deweyan insights regarding our social, 
moral, and historical situatedness, McGowan understands rights dynamically, 
as arising in actual interactions and negotiating actual relationships, attentive 
to both individuals and groups. Here rights are “practices” created as “solutions 
to problems that arise in human interactions.”15 On this account, rights are not 
only performative but “educative,” in Dewey’s sense: “the struggles embodied in 
human rights involve an effort to expand the relevant senses of membership be-
yond citizenship to every human being, and the continual effort to improve the 
ways that people treat their neighbors.”16 McGowan’s focus is “not on what rights 
are, but on what they can do.”17 
The closing chapter, “Liberal Democracy as Secular Comedy,” is the book’s 
most thought-provoking and ambitious. McGowan upends the familiar knock 
on pragmatism for its failure to plumb the tragic depths of human existence 
by presenting comedy as the quintessential pragmatist genre—and attitude. If 
tragedy reveals the way things really are, as Nietzsche suggests, then comedy 
imparts possibility. Comedy is “not metaphysical, but social”; it deals with selves 
in relation to each other rather than isolated individuals, moves from situations 
where fulfillment is blocked to its realization, celebrates change, and embraces 
the ordinary. Here too McGowan’s orientation is recognizably Deweyan, though 
he also takes cues from Bakhtin, Burke, and Cavell. Because the comic attitude 
aims to produce a “’love of the world’ of the sort Hannah Arendt championed,”18 
where love of the world entails “assuming responsibility for it,” it meshes well 
with the liberal democratic ethos of responsiveness that forms the book’s center 
of gravity. The comic attitude and vision are secular because our fate is always in 
the making: “love and justice are only to be won by our own efforts; there are no 
gods to hinder or aid us in that effort,”19 including in the face of mortality and 
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death, where they repudiate sacrifice, as he illustrates through a supple reading 
of Iris Murdoch’s Bruno’s Dream. Conspicuously absent here is any mention of 
the tragicomic orientation of Cornel West. Given McGowan’s sharp bifurcation 
of tragedy and comedy, an engagement with West’s perspective—specifically, 
his view of comedy as not just about possibility but a way of acknowledging the 
constraints on our freedom and “the incongruity between those high aspirations 
and where one actually ends up”20—would have been a valuable contribution to 
this neglected strand of the pragmatist tradition.
The final chapter is also the most risky. Its music is rehearsed in a different 
key than the earlier philosophical arguments. For some readers it may veer too far 
from the score, striking chords, as it does, with Dante, Shakespeare, Austen, Auden, 
and sounding popular culture references to Van Morrison and to films from It’s a 
Wonderful Life to My Best Friend’s Wedding to Witness. In these moments, depend-
ing on one’s perspective, McGowan is either in a zone, riffing and free-wheeling 
in an engaged pragmatist spirit, or the wheels have come off. For this reader, at 
least, it plays, and plays resplendently. The turn to secular comedy represents for 
McGowan a way to make political theory more pragmatist by “introducing issues 
of sensibility, desire, and fellow feeling—and crucially, the on-the-ground living 
out of our relations to others.”21 He explains that bringing secular comedy into a 
discussion of liberal democracy “reconnects politics with desire in a way that more 
sober political theory does not manage.”22 
Given the book’s more pressing concerns, these moves also are an impas-
sioned response to his background diagnosis of contemporary American society 
and democracy and his sense that the liberal democratic ethos must find “an 
idea that can inspire political action and an incentive for individuals to join 
in the effort to achieve it.”23 That said, the book’s salutary political bent may 
bend too far in the jeremiad we get in the book’s last dozen or so pages against 
the decline of public morality, overpaid and unscrupulous CEOs, the growth 
of economic inequality in the US, FEMA’s deficiencies in the wake of Hurri-
cane Katrina, and the general sullying of politics as “our collective creation of 
the world we want to inhabit together”24—certainly issues, among many, that 
deserve more attention from pragmatists. At the same time, for all the passion 
evident in these pages, more analysis and concrete proposals may have served 
the book’s overall aims better.
Nonetheless, this book has much to offer not only Deweyans, but pragmatists 
of all stripes. Given his focus on meliorism and transformative action, McGowan 
wisely seeks to steer clear of the “philosophical disputes that swirl around pragma-
tism,” aspiring to “metaphysical parsimony” in his account.25 Still, he is attuned to 
the inevitable reminder from “philosophical police” that even his pared-down em-
brace of contingency and possibility over necessity constitutes a metaphysical posi-
tion. Quite perceptively, he acknowledges his commitments and the baggage they 
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bring, while insisting that pragmatism ought to resist, in a nice turn of phrase, the 
“transcendental blackmail” of traditional philosophical arguments that amounts 
to, “I am aiming to get you to accept that metaphysical vision in order to then ar-
gue that it has (inevitable, or at least reasonable) consequences for how you should 
behave”26—a move that he observes both Dewey and Rorty sought to undermine 
in their critiques of necessity. In McGowan’s view, the productive “meta” question 
for pragmatists is, “What justifies the movement from a belief or a moral commit-
ment to a new belief or commitment?”27 
Among the many benefits of McGowan’s not pausing to parse the intra-
mural debates among contemporary pragmatists is being able to push beyond 
these entanglements to offer a meaningful and reasonable account with the po-
tential to move the tradition forward. A good example is his brief engagement 
with Robert Brandom, which yields “a dynamic understanding of everything 
involved in the articulation of reasons” that assimilates Brandom’s “rationalist” 
dimension of the conferral of conceptual content, Dewey’s social and cultural 
contextualism, James’s relationality, and Rorty’s answerability to one’s peers, yet 
without explicitly advertising it as such and setting off the alarms of any “philo-
sophical police.” Contextualizing the game of giving and asking for reasons such 
that one’s interlocutors are “real people . . . rooted in a place and a time” prompts 
two levels of responsiveness to which pragmatists should attend: the first order 
question of “What reasons—and how convincing are they—does this person ar-
ticulate as underwriting her actions, beliefs, recommendations, and (ultimately) 
ways of being in the world?”; and the second order questions, “To what specific 
others does this person feel answerable? Whom does she think she should—even 
must—address? To whom is she responsible?”28 With little fanfare, McGowan ef-
fectively integrates Brandom’s conception of deontic scorekeeping with Rorty’s 
critique of its abstraction from particular audiences, and wraps it all in gleaming 
Deweyan and Jamesian dress.29 An understanding of the articulation of reasons 
which pulls the self out into relation with concrete others is an important con-
tribution that I hope others will take up. 
In sum, Pragmatist Politics not only is a rich statement of what pragmatism is; 
its pages thoughtfully depict what pragmatism can become. “Liberal democracy,” 
McGowan tells us, “has a story to tell.”30 This book seeks to inspire pragmatists to 
start telling it, in ways that only they can.
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